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Abstract
Labor unions are said to inuence elections and public policy by increasing their members’
electoral turnout. But existing research likely overestimates the turnout eect of union
membership by ignoring sorting in the labor market. In the presence of a union wage
premium, both membership and turnout are shaped by the same (unobserved) factors,
such as cognitive ability. To disentangle the union eect from positive selection, we use
unique data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. It allows us to specify a
latent factor potential outcome model with matching on both observable and unobservable
individual characteristics. We nd that about one-third of the observed union turnout eect
is due to selection, more than what previous studies suggest.
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I. Introduction
e political power of labor unions is based to an important extent on unions’ ability to increase
voter turnout among their members, thereby inuencing election outcomes and a broad range of
economic policies at the local and national level (Anzia 2011, 2012; Bartels 2008; Becher, Stegmueller,
and Kaeppner 2018; Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018; Freeman and Medo 1984;
Masters and Delaney 2005; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). In line with this view, numerous
studies by political scientists, economists and sociologists have documented a positive relationship
between individual union membership and political participation in contemporary democracies
(Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Freeman 2003; Flavin and Radcli 2011; Leighley and Nagler
2007; Norris 2002; Rosenfeld 2014). However, economic theory suggests that in the presence of a union
wage premium, union membership is inuenced by the same (unobserved) personal characteristics
that inuence voter turnout. In particular, cognitive ability maers for both selection into union
jobs and the decision to turn out to vote. While selection into formal groups based on normative or
political motivations is a well-recognized identication problem in the literature on turnout (Abrams,
Iversen, and Soskice 2011), selection driven by sorting in the labor market has been neglected. In
fact, scholars oen assume that the importance of economic incentives for union membership in the
United States ensures that selection is not a problem for the study of voting (Kerrissey and Schofer
2013: 918; Rosenfeld 2014: 145).1
In this paper, we use data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) to demon-
strate the empirical relevance of the economic endogeneity problem and spell out an approach to
model it. Sorting in the labor market implies that union members and non-members dier system-
atically on fundamental determinants of political behavior. Exploiting the unique features of the
NLSY, we implement an empirical strategy that uses auxiliary information to allow us to estimate
the causal eect of union membership on turnout under comparatively weak assumptions.
We show empirically that union members in the NLSY are characterized by higher levels of
cognitive ability than non-members with the same socio-demographic prole. Research in labor
economics suggests that this ability gap is the result of sorting on both the employer and employee
side. e union wage gap induces more workers to apply for unionized jobs. Employers faced
with union wages above the competitive wage and collective bargaining agreements that restrict
ring have strong incentives to screen for higher ability job applicants. e result, then, is sorting
on ability between union and nonunion workers (Freeman and Medo 1984: 45; Robinson 1989:
643). Complementarily, research in political science has established a link between cognitive ability
and electoral turnout. Individuals with higher cognitive capacity are more likely to engage with
the political sphere and its abstract concepts and symbols. Ability has been shown to inuence
individual turnout propensities in behavioral studies using survey data, as well as in genetic studies
using twin data (Dawes et al. 2015; Denny and Doyle 2008; Hauser 2000; Luskin 1990; Nie, Junn,
and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Furthermore, ability shapes turnout
indirectly, since it inuences factors closely related to turnout, such as education, and political
interest and sophistication (Denny and Doyle 2008: 294).
e imbalance in ability between union members and non-members is usually not taken into
account in research on union membership and turnout. National election surveys simply do not
1e 2018 Supreme Court decision (Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees)
rules out union fees for non-members in the public sector.
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include the required data. e result is an endogeneity problem that makes it dicult to assess the
micro-foundations of the mobilizing eect of organized labor in the electoral arena.2 e problem also
exists where jobs are tied to becoming a union member (or at least paying a union fee). is includes
a majority of US states without “right-to-work” legislation. While such union shops may mitigate
endogeneity concerns based on explicit political motivations (Kim and Margalit 2017; Rosenfeld
2014), they do not rule out the more subtle but important problem based on economic selection.
In contrast to previous studies, our analysis explicitly models selection of individuals into a
unionized job and their decision vote on election day as function of both observable and unobservable
characteristics. Following recent advances in the analysis of treatment eects using observational
data (Abbring and Heckman 2007), we exploit the rich individual-level data of the NLSY. It allows
us to exploit dierent sources of causal identication and impose weaker assumption compared to
approaches exclusively relying on control variables or standard instrumental variables regression.
In line with insights from labor economics, our empirical approach captures employers’ incen-
tives to carefully screen candidates for more costly unionized jobs, as well as employees’ economic
incentives to obtain a union job. In particular, we specify and analyze a latent factor potential
outcome model of union membership and turnout in the 2006 congressional election. e model
exploits three distinct sources of causal identication: explicit economic incentives to become (or
remain) a union member, a latent variable structure that allows for unobserved (by the researcher)
correlations between sorting into union membership and voting, and high-quality cognitive tests
that vary independently of treatment status. To capture non-political incentives, we match individual
records with industry data, from which we compute instruments for the economic incentives of
obtaining a union job: the wage dierential between members and non-members in a particular
industry, and the level of concentration in a given industry. In addition, the model captures selection
bias due to endogenous union membership via a latent factor structure that allows the unobserved
factors driving union membership and the decision to vote to be correlated. To identify this latent
factor, we exploit the rich data structure of the NLSY and use a measurement system, which is not
subject to selection bias. An extensive baery of cognitive performance tests (conducted before re-
spondents’ entry into the labor market) allows us to measure an underlying latent variable, cognitive
ability, that comprises part of the (otherwise) unobservable latent factor.
We nd that there is sorting into unions by individuals with higher ability, who are also more
likely to vote. Selection accounts for about one third of the observed descriptive dierence in turnout
between members and non-members. Accounting for the selection process, there is nonetheless
robust evidence that unions increase the propensity of their members to participate in elections. On
average, union membership increases the probability of an individual to vote by about 10 percentage
points in the particular election we study—a politically signicant eect.
is paper contributes to several strands of research. First, it adds to the multi-disciplinary litera-
ture on the political eects of unions. Due to data limitations, most studies of union membership and
political preferences or voting rely on cross-sectional regression analysis with covariate adjustment.
Recent exceptions exploit quasi-random variation to estimate union eects. e study of Kim and
Margalit (2017) uses an innovative survey of union workers that allows for matching by industry and
exploit a shi in the position of a national union to estimate the eect of union membership on trade
2e common practice of controlling for political aitudes and other proximate predictors of turnout invites
post-treatment bias (e.g., see Samii 2016).
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policy preferences. Similarly, Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi (2014) examine the eect of unions on trade
policy preferences by studying dock workers within the same industry across unions with dierent
policy positions. Leveraging the dierential adoption of right-to-work laws, which weaken unions’
shop protections, in neighboring countries across state borders, Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and
Williamson (2018) nd that the laws reduce Democratic votes shares in presidential, congressional
and gubernatorial elections by about 3.5 percentage points. Taking a dierent approach, we provide
what we think is the rst study of the union-turnout link that jointly models selection into union
membership and turnout based on observable as well as unobservable factors. Focusing on voting
rather than policy preferences, our results suggest that the selection eect for turnout is larger than
the one found for trade preferences by Kim and Margalit (2017).
Second, our approach and ndings are also relevant for the broader turnout literature. Recent
formal theories of voting have turned their aention to group dynamics to explain voting in large
elections (Feddersen and Sandroni 2006; Herrera, Morelli, and Nunnari 2016). e fundamental
challenge facing group-based explanations of voting is to account for why individuals join certain
groups in the rst place (Feddersen 2004). Our empirical approach tackles the problem and quanties
the magnitude of the selection problem for a large group. It also illustrates the relevance of economic
theory for identifying potential sources of selection bias in political behavior and thereby providing
a clear basis for empirical research.
II. Endogenous union membership and voting
To motivate the empirical analysis to follow, let us clarify the problem with some notation.
Sorting may cause prospective voters to be more likely to become union members than prospective
non-voters—even in the context of union shops common in many U.S. states.
In any given election, we can only ever observe an individual in one of two possible states: being
a member of a trade union or not. us, the propensity to turn out on election day for each individual
is a potential outcome (Rubin 1978). Denote the two potential outcomes (turnout propensity) in
our two counterfactual states (union member, non-member) by Y1i and Y0i . For each individual, we
assume that the pair (Y0i ,Y1i ) exists, but we can only ever observe one possible state per individual so
thatYi = DiY1i+(1−Di )Y0i . e core quantity of interest of this paper, the eect of union membership
on turnout, is the average treatment eect ∆ = E(Y1i − Y0i ). is is the ceteris paribus eect on
turnout of moving an otherwise identical individual into union membership. us, for each union
membership state, Di = (0, 1) we need to identify the potential outcome in the alternative state. is
counterfactual outcome is unobserved. Both potential outcomes are a (possibly non-linear) function
of a vector of observed individual characteristics, µ(Xi ), such as age or education. Furthermore, we
need to account for unobserved confounders. e inuence of such unobservables is captured by
including individual random variablesUi . is yields the following two potential outcome equations:
Y0i = µ0(Xi ) +U0i if Di = 0 (1)
Y1i = µ1(Xi ) +U1i if Di = 1. (2)
Crucially, unobservables U0i and U1i may be correlated with unobservable factors explaining
sorting into union membership. We can think of sorting into union membership Di as a function of
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observable and unobservable individual characteristics:
D∗i = µD (Zi ) +UDi
Di = 1 if D∗i ≥ 0,Di = 0 otherwise.
(3)
Here, D∗i is a latent index representing the net utility or gain of union membership, Zi are observed
individual characteristics (including factors that make union jobs more aractive, such as union wage
dierentials), whereasUDi represents unobservables shiing the propensity of union membership.3
Unobserved individual characteristics aecting turnout and union membership are collected in
the random vector (U0i ,U1i ,UDi )′. Since factors inuencing union membership also shape potential
(turnout) outcomes, one has to allow for correlations between all unobservables. For a sample of
individuals, this yields the following 3 × 3 variance-covariance matrix of (U0,U1,UD )
Σ =

σ 20 σ01 σ0D
σ01 σ
2
1 σ1D
σ0D σ1D σ
2
D
 . (4)
Its diagonal entries represent the variances of unobservables in union and turnout equations. O-
diagonal entries capture the relationship between unobservables in turnout and union membership:
σjk parametrizes the covariance between Uj ,Uk . Notably, σ01 represents the covariance between
unobservables in potential outcome states for union members and non-union members. Since we can
never observe the same individual in two treatment states at once, σ01 is not identied from the data
(Vijverberg 1993: 74). is is the root of the well-known “fundamental problem of causal inference”
(Holland 1986: 947).
ere are clear reasons why one would expect sorting into unions based on unobservables
that also impact voting. eories of labor markets suggest that sorting into union jobs is based on
ability (related to expected productivity) as long as union jobs provide higher wages, benets, or
job security (Freeman and Medo 1984: 45; Robinson 1989: 643; see Borjas 2013: 444 for a recent
textbook treatment). On the worker side, beer wages or benets induce more workers to apply
for a unionized job, increasing the pool of aractive candidates. Even if employers are unwilling
to screen their job applicants, there will be sorting if higher ability types have a higher reservation
wage (e.g., beer outside options in self-employment). Employers, on the other hand, are faced with
union wages above the competitive wage and collective bargaining agreements that make it more
dicult to lay o unionized workers, e.g., by enforcing seniority rules (Abraham and Medo 1984).
is produces incentives to screen higher ability types out of the queue of workers applying for
unionized jobs (Abowd and Farber 1982). ese arguments (and their empirical support) strongly
suggest that we should expect sorting on ability between union and nonunion workers.
e threat to valid inference stems from the fact that cognitive ability is likely to also inuence
turnout. Ability is a fundamental trait discussed in the literature on turnout, but it is not measured
3e latent index structure is a common setup for many econometric choice models (e.g., Maddala 1986) and
is also used in ‘classical’ selection models (Heckman 1976). It is quite instructive to note the equivalence
between the (nonparametric) latent index model and the LATE approach of Imbens and Angrist (1994): the
assumption that there is an unobserved index crossing a threshold (above which we observe an individual
being a union member) is equivalent to the independence and monotonicity assumptions made for LATE.
See Vytlacil (2002) for a detailed discussion of the equivalence result.
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in most nationally representative election surveys (Luskin 1990; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995;
Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Hauser 2000). It systematically inuences turnout by shaping
education, civic skills, and political interest and sophistication (Denny and Doyle 2008: 294). Sorting
in the labor market is not perfect because screening is costly and job matching is probabilistic. But
given that ability is also a fundamental determinant of political participation, a correlation between
union membership and ability leads to an endogeneity problem for empirical research. While the
existence of union shops reduces concerns about sorting based on adherence to civic norms that
are frequently voiced in the empirical literature and can be derived from theories of social customs
(Akerlof 1980; Corneo 1997)4, it does not block the economic sorting mechanism.
To address this endogeneity problem, we draw on a growing literature in econometrics that
extends the potential outcomes framework for causal inference to non-random treatment assignment
with complex data structures, which can provide additional identifying information (Abbring and
Heckman 2007: 5166). We use a latent factor potential outcomes setup (see, e.g., Aakvik, Heckman,
and Vytlacil 2005; Heckman, Lopes, and Piatek 2013). It includes a latent factor capturing unobserved
individual heterogeneity that introduces a correlation between union membership and voting (i.e.,
σjk , 0). Moreover, our setup allows us to exploit additional information in order to impose less
restrictive identication assumptions. For our problem, the use of cognitive tests serves this purpose.
It captures the theoretical intuition, discussed above, that labor market sorting leads to a positive
correlation between ability and union membership. Note that cognitive tests are not employed as an
instrumental variable. Rather, they serve as a proxy for unobserved characteristics relevant for both
union membership and political participation that helps to pin down the structure of unobserved
heterogeneity (the section “Latent variable potential outcome model” provides more details).5
is identication strategy is complemented with the more ‘traditional’ approach of including
instruments that only shi the probability of union membership. Equation (3) above contains two
sets of covariates shaping sorting into unions: Zi = (Xi ,Wi ). First, Xi contains basic individual
background characteristics (or pre-treatment covariates), such as education, age, and gender. Second,
Wi contains one or more variables which make union membership an economically aractive option,
but are unrelated to election turnout (conditional onXi and θi ). ese serve as instrumental variables.
We include two instruments that both capture economic aspects of selection into union membership.
First, the higher the union wage or benet premium, the more likely it is that we nd a worker being
a union member (Lee 1978, Schnabel 2003: 14).6 A second factor inuencing union membership is
industry concentration: union organization is less costly in sectors with four rms than with 50 (Lee
1978: 416, Hirsch and Berger 1984, Stephens and Wallerstein 1991: 943). Higher levels of industrial
concentration are connected with higher wages for union members (Kwoka 1983) as well as higher
provision of fringe benets (Freeman 1980). Net of observed and unobserved worker characteristics,
industry concentration is predicted to encourage unionization. When introducing our model below,
4e structure of normative models of union membership is similar to group-based turnout models: Only
individuals with a cost of participation below a threshold will join or vote.
5Over the last twenty years the use of randomized eld experiments has revolutionized the study of electoral
mobilization (Gerber and Green 2000), but ethical and practical issues have by and large precluded their
application to the central question of group membership and voting.
6Wage dierentials may be due to monopoly power, rm-worker matching on productivity, or represent
compensatory payments for work conditions.
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we discuss possible threats to the validity of these instruments and how we address them.7 Aer
describing the data set that enables our analysis, we explain how we transform this conceptual
framework into an empirically estimable setup.
III. Data
We use the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY), a longitudinal panel study directed by
the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.8 Its widespread use in economics is due to
the high quality of its sample design, data collection, and the availability of cognitive measurements
(e.g., Lang and Manove 2011). Due to its mission the NLSY does not include political questions.
However, in an exceptional collaboration the American National Election Study (ANES) was able to
place a short set of political items in the NLSY 2008 wave, including the turnout question asked in
each ANES survey (Krosnick and Lupia 2006). We make use of this unique data-set (which includes
rich information on individuals) to study the eect of union membership on turnout.
e key design characteristic of the NLSY is that it is a nationally representative sample of
certain birth cohorts. Currently there are two NLSY panels: a recent one started in 1997, comprised
of cohorts born between 1980 and 1984, and a long-run panel started in 1979, which is made up of
cohorts born between January 1, 1957, and December 31, 1964 (and who resided in the US in 1979).
We use the laer for our analysis, since it focuses on individuals who participated in the labor market
for a substantial number of years. Due to the cohort design of the NLSY, they are between 41 and
50 years old in 2006. We focus on male respondents only, in order to work with a sample from a
population generated by a reasonably homogeneous data generating process. A complete analysis of
women’s union membership would have to include an explicit model of their decision to participate
in the labor market, which is beyond the scope of this paper.9 is yields a sample size of 2,460
respondents. We match each individual in this micro-data set with industry characteristics (industry
concentration and industry union-nonunion wage dierentials) calculated from administrative data
sources.
Industry characteristics. We calculate union-nonunion wage dierentials from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ CPS-LU series, which, based on Current Population Survey data, provides wages for
workers (not) covered by union wage contracts. To avoid small sample bias, we use a lower resolution
than for our concentration measure and calculate wage dierentials for 19 major industrial sectors.
Our measure of union-nonunion wage dierentials is the dierence in median weekly earnings of
full-time employed union members and non-members at the 2-digit industry level.
Industrial concentration has a long history in economics. It is usually measured by the ratio
of the combined market share of the four largest rms to the whole market size of that industry
(Pryor 1972), the so called CR4 concentration ratio. We use concentration ratios based on the Census
7It is important to remember that the model is identied without any instrumental variables. Absent any
valid instruments, however, we need a distributional assumption on the latent variable. We return to this
issue below.
8e NLSY79 survey is sponsored and directed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and conducted by
the Center for Human Resource Research at e Ohio State University. Interviews are conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. See www.bls.gov/nls for more details.
9We also exclude NLSY’s military subsample, as members of the military are not union members.
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Figure I
Distribution of industry characteristics.
Panel (a) shows union wage dierentials measured via dierences in median weekly earnings (in $) between
union members and non-members. Panel (b) shows levels of industrial concentration measured via the 4-rm
concentration ratio. Histograms with kernel density plots.
Bureau’s Economic Census of American businesses in 2007.10 e high quality of this data allows us
to use detailed disaggregated concentration ratios for 243 industries.
Figure I plots the distribution of union wage dierentials and industrial concentration.11 It
shows the existence of substantial variation in both variables. In the majority of industries union
dierentials are around 100 dollars a week (for example, in health care and social assistance), but
they range from −100 (in nance and insurance) to almost 350 dollars (in construction). e market
share held by the four largest rms ranges from less than 10 percent in some industries to over 80 in
others. For example, within the non-durable goods manufacturing sector, the four largest rms in
the textile mills industry hold only about 16 percent of the total market share, while tire production
is highly concentrated, with over 70 percent in the hands of the four largest rms.
Cognitive ability tests. In 1980, the Department of Defense and the Department of Labor jointly
sponsored the administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Baery (ASVAB, see Jensen
1985) to the civilian and military NLSY79 samples.12 e ASVAB consists of several subtests that
measure aptitude in areas such as arithmetic reasoning, coding speed, mathematics, and word
knowledge. We follow recent innovations in the economics literature and construct a measurement
model, which posits an underlying latent variable—cognitive ability—that produces observed test
scores, thus accounting for the fact that an individual’s scores on a test and his or her general
10e Economic Census is conducted in 5-year intervals and samples around 4 million rms. Participation is
required by law.
11Appendix A contains more detailed descriptive information on these two variables.
12e DoD uses a subset of the ASVAB to create an Armed Forces alications Test score (AFQT) as a
general measure of trainability used in Armed Forces enlistment.
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cognitive ability are not the same thing.
Turnout. Aer the November election in 2006 respondents were queried if they voted.13 To reduce
over-reporting respondents had several options to indicate abstention: “I did not vote in the November
2006 election”, “I thought about voting in 2006, but didn’t”, “I usually vote, but didn’t in 2006”.14
Turnout was indicated by the response option “I am sure I voted”. We create an indicator variable
equal to one if a respondent chose this option and zero otherwise.
Controls. We include a number of additional variables to capture heterogeneity between individuals.
A respondent’s income is measured as total wage and salary income before taxes and deductions.
Education is captured by years of schooling. Besides accounting for family size, we include indicator
variables for being married, unemployment spells in the previous calendar year, living in a rural area,
and a Southern state dummy. In order to capture well-known turnout dierences of minority groups,
we also include indicator variables for Black and Hispanic. To account for the cohort design of the
NLSY, we also create a set of indicator variables capturing systematic cohort dierences.
Table I provides descriptive means of our central variables for union members and non-members.
It shows that the (unadjusted) dierence in turnout is 14 percentage points.15 In terms of observable
characteristics, union members experience fewer unemployment spells and are less likely to be from
the South, where right-to-work legislation is predominant. Union members work in industries that
are characterized by larger wage dierentials and are more concentrated. Most notably, we also nd
that union members are characterized by higher levels of cognitive ability that non-members (despite
having rather similar levels of education). Insofar as cognitive ability also shapes turnout—we show
later that a standard deviation increase in ability is associated with a more than seven percentage
point increase in turnout—this raises clear concerns about the presence of selection bias.
IV. Latent variable potential outcome model
In this section we discuss a solution to the endogeneity problem outlined previously. e latent
variable potential outcome model we specify exploits the rich information available in our data to
add statistical structure allowing us to identify potential outcomes and derive the relevant treatment
eects. First, as noted above, a joint model of potential outcomes and union membership does not
contain any information about the correlation between potential outcomes, (Y0,Y1).16 What is needed
13e text of this questions reads: “In talking to people about elections, we oen nd that a lot of people were
not able to vote because they were sick or they just didn’t have time or for some other reason. Which of
the following statements best describes you?”
14Over-reporting of turnout is a well-known problem. While we argue that over-reporting per se is not
necessarily a problem for our inferences (because the model works with dierences in turnout outcomes),
we compared our data to the American National Election Study. Mean turnout in our data set (for union
members and non-members combined) is 62.8%. is is at the lower end of the 95% condence bound of
turnout among the same age group obtained from the “gold standard” ANES (Aldrich and McGraw 2011),
which ranges from 61 to 81%.
15is is nearly identical to the unadjusted dierence in the employed population for mid-term elections
based on CPS data which is 13 percentage points (Freeman 2003). Averaging across all elections between
1984-2008, the dierence is closer to 10 percentage points (Rosenfeld 2014).
16From here on we assume that we have access to an equiprobability sample and suppress individual subscripts
for easier notation.
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Table I
Sample characteristics. Means and standard errors.
Union members Non-members
[N=456] [N=2004]
Turnout rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.73 (0.02) 0.59 (0.01)
Individual characteristics
Income [1000$] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.98 (1.44) 50.69 (1.22)
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.11 (0.10) 13.26 (0.06)
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.31 (0.02) 0.31 (0.01)
Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.21 (0.02) 0.19 (0.01)
Family size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.96 (0.07) 2.83 (0.03)
Married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.65 (0.02) 0.58 (0.01)
Unemployment exp.a. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 (0.01) 0.12 (0.01)
Rural area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.78 (0.02) 0.73 (0.01)
South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.22 (0.02) 0.45 (0.01)
Cognitive ability (θˆ )b. . . . . . . . . . . . 0.79 (0.25) -0.14 (0.21)
Industry characteristics
Industry concentrationc. . . . . . . . . . 28.58 (1.08) 23.21 (0.47)
Wage dierential [$/week]d. . . . . . 150.17 (4.14) 128.23 (2.46)
Note: Cohort dummies and variables in test equations not shown to save space. Details on the
construction of all variables are available in appendix A.
a Unemployed in past calendar year (indicator variable).
b Estimated cognitive ability. See equation (11) for a discussion of its construction in our model
and estimation. Measure is normalized in sample to have mean zero and standard deviation of 10.
c 4-rm concentration ratio CR4.
d Dierence in median weekly earnings (in $) of full-time employed union members and non-
members at 2-digit industry level.
for identication are the joint distributions (UD ,U0) and (UD ,U1) of unobservables in treatment and
outcome equations (Chib 2007; Heckman 1990). ese can be obtained by parameterizing the
structure of Cov(UD ,U1,U0) in equation (4) using an underlying low-dimensional set of random
factors (Heckman 1981). us, following Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005), we decompose
unobservables using the following factor structure:
UD = αDθ + ϵD (5)
U0 = α0θ + ϵ0 (6)
U1 = α1θ + ϵ1 (7)
Here, θ is a latent factor or random eect (Cameron and Heckman 1998; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh
2004), which represents unobserved individual heterogeneity, such as dierences in cognitive ability,
which systematically shape both union membership and the propensity to turn out on election day.
Note that θ is allowed to aect union choice and potential outcomes dierently.
Assuming this factor structure solves the core identication problem (Aakvik, Heckman, and
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Vytlacil 2005; Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman 2003).17 To see this, note that the non-identied
parameter, σ10 ≡ Cov(Y0,Y1), can now be obtained as α0α1. e latent factor generates the correlation
between potential outcomes and treatment choices. Assuming that the factor structure captures
a relevant part of unobserved individual characteristics, such as ability, which is approximately
normally distributed in the population, the fundamental identication problem is removed. Below
we add two more sources of information, providing more robust identication of the eect of
union membership on turnout. Before doing so, we detail our specications of turnout and union
membership equations.
We specify θ ∼ N (0, 1). is is an a priori distributional assumption. While it is quite robust
against misspecication (Bartholomew 1988; Neuhaus, Hauck, and Kalbeisch 1992; Wedel and
Kamakura 2001), it is not necessary for identication and can be relaxed.18 To x the sign of the
latent factor (Anderson and Rubin 1956), we x αD to 1.19 us, we anchor θ to the union membership
equation, such that higher values of θ induce union membership.
Union membership. We specify sorting into union membership via a latent index model (Heckman
and Vytlacil 1999, 2007) with a linear-in-parameters formulation.20
D∗ = β ′DZ + αDθ + ϵD . (8)
D = 1(D∗ > 0) (9)
Here βD is a parameter vector associated with covariates in Z (more below), while αD is the latent
factor coecient. Errors ϵD are white noise (normalized to have variance one) and assumed orthogo-
nal to Z and θ . We observe union membership D whenever the latent index D∗ crosses a threshold
(set to zero whiteout loss of generality).
We partition covariates Z into two subvectors Z = (X ,W ), whereX are individual characteristics
that also enter the turnout equations whileW are variables only used in the turnout equation (referred
to as instruments or exclusions). In our applicationW captures the economic benets of union
membership and, together with the latent factor θ , shis the propensity sore of union membership
P(D = 1|W = w).
e fact that we have non-political variablesW in Z that encourage union membership (ceteris
paribus), but which are unrelated to turnout decisions, provides an additional source of identication
17Another way to deal with this fundamental non-identication is to provide bounds instead of a point
estimate, by leveraging the positive deniteness constraint of the variance covariance matrix (Vijverberg
1993; Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997) or the prior dependence between identied and unidentied
parameters (Koop and Poirier 1997; Poirier 1998). However obtained bounds are oen quite wide. Further-
more, results are highly inuenced by specic prior choices (Poirier and Tobias 2003), and formulating
informed a priori values is dicult.
18Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) discuss nonparamet-
ric identication of θ and ϵD , ϵ0, ϵ1. In appendix F we use an extended model with a nonparametric
distributional specication for θ and show that assuming a normal distribution is a sensible approximation.
19is ‘rotation problem’ of latent factor models occurs since elements of α = (αD ,α0,α1,αM1, . . . ,αMP )′ can
switch sign. To see the problem more precisely, let R be a matrix such that R′R = I and note that α (R) = αR′.
In other words, α is rotation invariant, we obtain the same likelihood when we “ip” it (Anderson and Rubin
1956). ere are several solution strategies, and we choose the simplest one, by xing one α coecient.
20In other words, we set µ(Z ) = ZβD . For a discussion of linear-in-parameters specications in latent index
models, see Eckstein and Wolpin 1989.
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in our model. is, of course, depends crucially on the strength and validity of the chosen instruments.
While we show below that both industrial wage dierentials and concentration are strongly related
to turnout, their exclusion restriction cannot be veried empirically and thus remains subject to
(potentially contested) plausibility arguments. For our instruments to be valid, there should be no
direct eect of industrial concentration or wage structure on turnout beyond union membership
aer conditioning on education, race, location, birth cohort and heterogeneity (θ ). Note that our
model accounts for sorting into industries or regions based on socio-demographic background
and earnings potential. While the literature on turnout suggests no obvious direct eect of these
industry characteristics on voting, we identify one threat to the exclusion restriction of industrial
concentration. If hurdles to overcome free-riding problems for rms interested in political protection
are lower in more concentrated industries, one expects more political activity by business in such
industries, such as higher campaign contributions (Piman 1977; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994).
is may also foster electoral mobilization, including higher levels of turnout. Even though the
empirical evidence linking concentration to corporate political activity is somewhat mixed (see the
review in Mao and Zaleski 2001), this argument makes at least plausible the possibility that the
exclusion restriction for industrial concentration does not hold.
We address this problem from two angles. First, we provide robustness tests where we study
our results when industrial concentration is not included inW . Second, we provide results without
both instruments (i.e., Z = X ). Note that the presence of valid instruments is not required to identify
the model—this is achieved by estimating the distribution of the latent factor aecting both union
membership and turnout potential outcomes. In the absence of a valid instrument we are reliant on
the functional form assumption for θ .21 We provide empirical evidence for the plausibility of this
functional form assumption, by estimating the distribution of θ nonparametrically (Appendix F).
Turnout. For each potential outcome Yd (d = 0, 1) we assume that it is generated by an underlying
latent outcome Y ∗d (propensity to turnout) using the following specication:
Y ∗d = β
′
dX + αdθ + ϵd d = 0, 1
Yd = 1(Y ∗d > 0).
(10)
In this setup, each latent potential outcome is shaped by observed individual characteristics X and
their associated parameter vectors βd and by the latent factor θ with associated coecients αd . Errors
ϵd are assumed to be independent of X and θ .22
So far, our latent factor potential outcome model contains two independent sources of identica-
tion, the factor structure θ and instrumentsW . Our third source of more robust model identication
21In turn, having access to a valid instrument means that θ can be identied nonparametrically. See Heck-
man (1990) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) for conditions for nonparametric identication of θ when
instruments are available.
22To be explicit, we employ the following technical assumptions (next to the ones listed in the text). (1) µ(Z )
is a non-degenerate random variable conditional on X, i.e., we have a valid exclusion restriction, such that
a variable determines union choice but not turnout. (2) e joint distributions of unobservables (UD ,U1)
and (UD ,U0) are absolutely continuous (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure on R2). (3) Independence of covariates,
(UD ,U1) ⊥ (X ,Z ) and (UD ,U0) ⊥ (X ,Z ) (a standard instrumental variable assumption, which could be
relaxed by conditioning on X). (4) Finally, the existence of treated and untreated individuals for each set of
confounders X, 1 > Pr (D = 1|X ) > 0.
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is created by utilizing the panel-structure of our data to extract auxiliary information, which is
independent of treatment status, and which we use to identify variation in θ .
Cognitive tests. We use a baery of aptitude tests, which proxy individuals’ cognitive ability. As
we have argued above, ability is an important unobservable that likely aects both turnout and
union membership through employer selection or self-selection. ese tests were administered to all
respondents in our sample when they were young adults. erefore, test scores vary exogenously, i.e.,
they are not inuenced by sorting into union membership (taking place a decade later). Assuming
that observed test scores are systematically related to θ , their variation provides an additional source
of identication.
Technically, we have a measurement system M that is independent of individuals’ treatment
status D, and which is adjoined to the latent factor θ (Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman 2003). Our
measurement system is comprised of P observed variables, namely several ASVAB measures of
ability. Each measurement p (p = 1, . . . , P ) is generated by a linear combination of θ and controls,
Xp , which we include to account for their possibly biasing inuence on observed test scores (such as
family background or the fact that individuals take the test at dierent ages).23 Random variables
ϵMp denote idiosyncratic variation in tests scores that are not explained by background covariates or
the latent factor.24
Mp = X
′
pωp + αMpθ + ϵMp p = 1, . . . , P . (11)
Aaching this measurement system to θ achieves three things. First, it provides meaning to the
latent factor, i.e., it yields evidence (via statistical tests of αMp ) to what extent θ captures unobserved
cognitive ability. Second, it anchors θ and eases its interpretation in relation to a tangible object,
such as test performance. ird, it provides more robust identication. Having measurements on θ
that are independent of D—i.e., individuals were administered cognitive tests irrespective of future
union membership—provides an additional source of identication in the model (Carneiro, Hansen,
and Heckman 2003).
Treatment eects Using this statistical structure we can identify our central quantity of interest: the
eect of union membership on the probability of turnout. We focus on the average treatment eect,
which can be derived from the estimated coecients of our model (other treatment parameters can
be derived similarly).25 Appendix C provides a formal characterization.
Estimation We jointly estimate all treatment, potential outcome, and measurement equations using
the Bayesian framework. Note that the model is identied under classical criteria.26 A key advantage
23Table B.1 gives an overview of all variables used in choice, turnout, and test equations.
24ey are assumed to be distributed mean zero with nite variance, σ 2Mp , and independent of all covariates
and the latent factor. is is a standard conditional independence assumption made in measurement
models (see e.g. Jackman 2008), stating that conditional on the latent variable errors are independent.
25Note that the structure outlined here can identify distributions of treatment eects, a possibility we do not
explore in this paper.
26Bayesian models for potential outcomes are comparatively rare (but see Heckman, Lopes, and Piatek (2013)).
Note that estimating the system of equations using maximum likelihood (using Gauss-Hermite quadrature
to integrate over θ ) yields comparable results. In fact, we use ML estimates as starting values for our Gibbs
sampler.
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of the Bayesian approach is that we recover the full posterior distribution of the average treatment
eect as part of the model. To complete the Bayesian model setup we assign priors to all model
parameters. We choose “non-informative” priors so that all inference in our model is dominated by
the data. Details on the parametrization of our prior parameter distributions are given in Appendix D.
ere we also conduct sensitivity checks to show that our results do not depend on particular prior
choices (Lopes and Tobias 2011).27
V. Results
In this section we provide a detailed discussion of our model estimates. We rst discuss our
model parameter estimates and then the resulting treatment eect of union membership.
V.A. Parameter estimates
Union membership. Table II shows estimates from the union membership equation (8). It shows
a summary of the posterior distribution for each parameter—its mean and standard deviation, as
well as the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) region.28 For easier interpretation of eect sizes,
the nal column of Table II displays rst dierences in predicted probabilities. As discussed above,
the coecient of the latent factor θ is normalized to unity in the selection equation. It aects union
membership substantially: even aer accounting for observable dierences between union members
(such as being black or living in a rural area), a standard deviation change in θ raises the probability
of union membership by 33 percentage points. Conditional on covariates and the latent factor, we
nd that both of our instruments induce union membership in the expected way. e higher the
dierential between union and non-union wages, the higher the probability of union membership.
Similarly, working in a more highly concentrated industry raises the probability of being a union
member by around 3 percentage points. e condence bounds for both coecients are far away
from zero.
Test scores. Given the clear importance of θ in our model, we now investigate if it captures mean-
ingful dierences between individuals. If θ does represent (to some extent) cognitive abilities, we
should nd that it signicantly shapes observed cognitive test scores. Table III shows estimates
from our measurement system of ASVAB test items, given in equation (11). We nd that θ has a
substantial inuence on achieved test scores. Higher values of θ are associated with higher coding
speed, improved arithmetic reasoning, and more knowledge of language and mathematics. To a lesser
extent it also inuences basic reading comprehension. Inspecting 95% HPD intervals shows that
all relationships are highly statistically reliable. e availability of these additional measurements
allows us to give meaning to the latent factor in our model. ese relationships hold while adjusting
for individual background variables, which might bias test results. For example, one would expect
27We estimate our model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. We use data augmentation to sample
latent index variables D∗, Y ∗1 , and Y ∗0 (Albert and Chib 1993). Conditional on samples from these, all other
parameters can be sampled via Gibbs sampling steps.
28More precisely a region R is a 100(1 − α) percent HPD region (not necessarily contiguous) for parameter θ
if (1) P(θ ∈ R) = 1 − α and (2) P(θ1) ≥ P(θ2) for all θ1 ∈ R and θ2 < R, i.e., it yields an interval estimate
with the added requirement that each value in the interval is larger than those outside of it.
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Table II
Union membership equation [D = 1] parameter estimates.
Mean SD 95% HPD Prob.a
Latent factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.000b 0.332
Industry concentration . . . . 0.133 0.024 0.085 0.177 0.032
Union wage di. . . . . . . . . . . 0.195 0.025 0.147 0.243 0.049
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.476 0.027 −0.530 −0.424 −0.082
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.025 0.061 0.903 1.141 0.134
Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.450 0.068 0.309 0.577 0.044
Rural area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.157 0.059 0.040 0.270 0.016
South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.692 0.055 −0.800 −0.584 −0.064
Note: Cohort dummies and intercept not shown
a First dierence in predicted probabilities of unit change in z
b Fixed parameter
Table III
ASVAB test equations parameter estimates.
Mean SD 95% HPD
Factor eects
Arithmetic reasoning . . . . . . . . 6.735 0.097 6.547 6.929
Word knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.195 0.116 6.956 7.409
Paragraph comprehension . . . 2.892 0.053 2.787 2.991
Coding speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.784 0.234 10.304 11.219
Math knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.406 0.083 5.251 5.575
Test covariatesa
Age at test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.156 0.050 0.061 0.256
Broken family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.364 0.103 −0.561 −0.163
Education mother . . . . . . . . . . . 0.532 0.062 0.418 0.657
Education father . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.314 0.066 0.183 0.441
Number siblings . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.336 0.052 −0.435 −0.233
Family income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.232 0.057 0.125 0.350
Note: Intercepts and variances not shown
a Covariate eects ωp set equal across test items. See appendix A for variable denitions.
that an individual which came from a broken home (dened as living with a single parent), or from a
low-resource familial background (as indicated by many siblings or low family income), would do
worse on a test (holding their ability constant). ese distorting inuences do indeed exist and are
accounted for in our measurement model.
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Figure II
Distribution of cognitive ability (posterior means of θ ) by treatment status
Figure II plots the distribution of θ for union members and non-members. We construct this
plot by drawing 500 samples from the posterior distribution of θi , calculate the posterior expectation,
E(θi ) for each individual, and then calculate a kernel density estimate. Figure II indicates that union
members dier from non-members in that they have somewhat higher levels of (latent) ability. ere
is a larger portion of union members with ability above the mean (remember that θ is normalized
to zero in the population) than non-members. is point is made more formally in Table IV, which
shows estimates of the mean of the latent factor for union members and non-members, as well as
the 20th and 80th quantile. It conrms that union members do, on average, have higher levels of
ability than non-members, consistent with the economic argument that employer screening as well as
self-selection leads to sorting into higher paid union jobs. It also shows that the distribution is more
compressed among union members, i.e., at the 20th percentile of the distribution union members
have substantially fewer low θ values than non-members. e same nding obtains (somewhat less
pronounced) at the top of the distribution. is result underscores, once again, the importance of
accounting for dierences in unobservables between individuals.
Turnout. e previous paragraph has shown clear evidence for selection into union membership
based on unobservables. If these inuence turnout as well, then ignoring them leads to biased
inferences. Our setup provides for a straightforward test of this issue: if unobservables driving union
membership also inuence turnout we will nd signicant parameter estimates for α0 and α1 in
both potential outcome equations. Table V shows posterior parameter summaries for equations (10),
as well as eect sizes via rst dierences in predicted probabilities. Panel (A) displays coecient
estimates for union members, panel (B) for non-members. We nd that unobserved individual
heterogeneity θ does indeed substantially aect turnout in both potential outcome states. Both
coecients are of sizable magnitude and their posterior uncertainty intervals are far away from
zero. us, we clearly reject the hypothesis that there are no selection eects. e latent factor has a
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Table IV
Means and quantiles of cognitive ability distribution by treatment status
Union members Non-members Dierence
Mean . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.079 (0.025) −0.014 (0.021) 0.093 (0.017)
20th percentile . . . . . −0.702 (0.039) −0.924 (0.029) 0.221 (0.038)
80th percentile . . . . . 0.842 (0.042) 0.915 (0.029) −0.073 (0.038)
Note: Uncertainty of estimates in parentheses. Calculated using Monte Carlo integration (2,000 draws from pos-
terior distribution of θi ).
slightly stronger inuence on the turnout choice of union members. A standard deviation change
raises their probability of turnout by 8.5 percentage points, while the corresponding gure among
non-members is 7.5 percentage points.
Another way to illustrate the role played by unobservables is to calculate the covariance or
correlation between them.29 e correlation between unobservables shaping union membership and
unobservables shaping turnout for union members, Corr (U1,UD ), is 0.21, while the their correlation
for non-members, Corr (U0,UD ), is 0.14. is, again, illustrates the importance of accounting for
unobservables, which shape both union membership and the propensity to vote on election day.
e role of observed confounders in Table V is as expected from previous research. In particular,
higher socio-economic status (income, education) is associated with a higher propensity to vote.
Notably, income has a much more pronounced eect on potential outcomes among union members
than among non-members. e fact that several more control variables have dierent eects for
union members and non-members underscores the importance of using a specication with potential-
outcome-specic covariate eects.
V.B. Resulting treatment eects
In contrast to the wealth of tables produced in the previous section, the summary of our treatment
eects is straightforward. Following equation (C.1) in the appendix, we calculate the (population)
average treatment eect of union membership on turnout. e rst line of Table VI shows a summary
of the posterior distribution of this quantity. e average treatment eect of union membership
on turnout is estimated as 0.104 ± 0.018. Even aer accounting for selection on observables and
unobservables, union membership increases the likelihood of turnout by 10.4 percentage points. 95%
of the posterior density of the average treatment eect lies between roughly 7 and 14%—clearly quite
a way from being zero. Since the dierence between members and non-members in the raw data
(recall Table I) is fourteen points, our results suggest that selection accounts for about one third and
perhaps as much as one half of the observed dierence. In other words, unions do increase voter
participation, though the type of person who becomes a union member is quite dierent, on average,
from one who does not.
29e correlation betweenUD andU0 is given by α0√2√1+α 20 and mutatis mutandis forU1.
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Table V
Potential outcome equations parameter estimates
Mean SD 95% HPD Prob.a
(A) Union members [Y1]
Latent factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.312 0.088 0.146 0.490 0.085
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.232 0.109 0.029 0.456 0.065
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.352 0.081 0.198 0.514 0.094
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.324 0.144 0.032 0.599 0.044
Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.136 0.137 −0.124 0.409 0.016
Family size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.070 0.067 −0.062 0.201 0.021
Married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.122 0.133 −0.132 0.390 0.018
Unemployment exp. . . . . . . −0.367 0.193 −0.759 −0.002 −0.038
Rural area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.210 0.131 −0.461 0.053 −0.030
South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.306 0.131 0.057 0.565 0.043
(B) Non-members [Y0]
Latent factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.207 0.039 0.131 0.285 0.075
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.076 0.031 0.018 0.137 0.028
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.355 0.034 0.288 0.421 0.124
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.268 0.066 0.138 0.398 0.046
Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.303 0.067 −0.431 −0.170 −0.046
Family size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.115 0.030 0.056 0.172 0.042
Married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.323 0.060 0.202 0.439 0.058
Unemployment exp. . . . . . . −0.271 0.072 −0.413 −0.134 −0.033
Rural area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.015 0.054 −0.094 0.120 0.003
South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.075 0.049 −0.171 0.017 −0.014
Note: Cohort dummies and intercept not shown.
a First dierence in predicted probability of unit change in covariate.
Robustness tests We conduct several robustness checks, which are summarized in the lower half
of Table VI. In our rst specication, we include state xed eects. ese capture time-constant
state-level confounders omied from our model. e most relevant among those is probably “right-to-
work” (RTW) legislation. Under such a law, employees in unionized workplaces may opt out of union
membership without foregoing collective benets. In terms of our model, this systematically aects
unobserved costs of union membership in some states. Since RTW legislation is time-constant in our
sample, including state xed eects captures its eect. Furthermore, we estimated models including
an indicator variable for public sector employment, as well as industry xed eects (thus using
only within-industry changes in concentration levels).30 Finally, we used a more radical random
subsample approach to gauge the stability of our inference. We re-estimate our models 5 times, while
30We use the North American Industry Classication System (NAICS), 2002 revision, at the 1-digit level.
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Table VI
Eect of union membership on turnout. Average Treatment
Eect estimates from baseline model and under several
alternative specications.
Mean SD 95% HPD
Baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.104 0.018 0.069 0.139
Specication checks
State xed eects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.110 0.025 0.061 0.159
Public sector employment . . . . . 0.108 0.019 0.071 0.144
Industry xed eects . . . . . . . . . . 0.102 0.018 0.069 0.138
Random subsamples . . . . . . . . . . . 0.119 0.023 0.076 0.167
Exclusion restrictions
Only one instrument . . . . . . . . . . 0.074 0.030 0.015 0.130
No instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.082 0.030 0.022 0.137
Note: Based on 10,000 MCMC samples. Values are probability dierences.
each time randomly deleting one third of observations and then average our estimates with an added
penalty for variability (following the rules of Lile and Rubin 2002). As Table VI shows, we nd
our central results conrmed: the substantive magnitude of ATE estimates is very similar. In fact,
the credible intervals of all robustness models strongly overlap, suggesting that results do not dier
statistically.
While the two instruments provide a useful source of arguably exogenous variation, in the
model specication section we have discussed a potential violation of the exclusion restriction with
respect to industry concentration. Following a logic of collective action, concentrated industries
may see higher political mobilization even in the absence of unions. However, excluding industry
concentration from the analysis leads to similar results. e average treatment eect is slightly smaller
but remains politically relevant and precisely estimated. While we cannot think of a theory suggesting
the industry wage is not a valid instrument, given the model and auxiliary information from test
scores we can also identify the eect of union membership on turnout when both instruments are
excluded.
VI. Conclusion
e eect of labor unions on voting concerns the fundamental relationship between the economic
sphere and democratic politics. In this paper, we have used a unique survey data set to provide robust
estimates of the causal eect of union membership on turnout in the presence of positive selection.
Our empirical approach accounts for the problem labor markets may sort prospective voters into
union jobs. To jointly model endogenous union membership and vote choice, we have drawn on
three distinct sources of causal identication in the presence of unobserved confounders: economic
incentives captured via industry-specic variables, a random factor structure, and explicit measures
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of cognitive ability. We nd that sorting into union membership based on workers’ ability accounts
for a signicant part of the observed turnout gap between otherwise comparable union members
and non-members. is stands in contrast to previous studies, which have mostly assumed that
economic sorting is not a problem. Accounting for sorting, however, there remains a statistically and
politically signicant union membership turnout premium.
One limitation of this study is that it only considers one election for the cohort that makes up
the NLSY. is reects data constraints. While the panel survey we analyze is exceptionally rich in
economic and psychological items, it rarely measures turnout. ere is obviously no easy statistical
x for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in the study of political participation. One main
advantage of the approach we have taken is that it exploits high-quality data on individual abilities
that are not featured in surveys frequently used to study voting (like the American National Election
Study). It clearly illustrates the potential of including similar items, possibly in an abridged version,
in election surveys. Taken together, our analysis confronts the problem of endogenous membership
raised by both theoretical and empirical scholars of groups and voting, and shows how it can be
addressed empirically.
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Appendix
A. Variable definitions
Here we list all variables used in our model together with their denitions. Until noted otherwise
these are based on NLSY data. Income is measured as total wage and salary income before taxes
and deductions in contemporary US dollars. Education is years of schooling completed. Black and
Hispanic are indicator variables (based on self-assessed race). Married is an indicator variable for
being married. South is an indicator variable for living in a Southern state (as dened by Census
region). Rural area is an indicator for living in a rural area (dened following the Census denition
of living in an ‘urbanized area’ or in a place with greater than 2,500 population). Family size is the
number of persons living in a household (based on household enumeration data). Unemployment
experience is an indicator variable equal to one if a respondent was unemployed for any period of
time in the past calendar year.
e following variables were used as controls in our cognitive test equations. Education father and
Education mother are the highest grade completed by father and mother (based on the respondent’s
information). Missing information on these variables is imputed from predictions based on family
income in 1980.31 Broken family is an indicator equal to 1 if a respondent lived with a single parent
at age 14. Number of siblings is the number of siblings in the respondent’s household at age 14 (from
household enumeration information). Family income 1980 is a respondent’s family’s income in 1980
(from household interview data). Age at test is a respondent’s age when taking the cognitive test.
Industry concentration and the Union wage dierential are calculated from administrative sources.
We calculate union-nonunionwage dierentials from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPS-LU series, for
19 major industrial sectors. Our measure is the dierence in median weekly earnings in contemporary
dollars. Values refer to sole or principal job of full-time wage and salary workers. Excluded are all
self-employed workers regardless of whether or not their businesses are incorporated. Industrial
concentration is captured using the CR4 concentration ratio from the Census Bureau’s Economic
Census of American businesses conducted in 2007 for 243 industries. Table A.1 shows union-non-
union wage dierentials; Figure A.1 plots histograms of industry concentration ratios separately for
the 16 major sectors of the economy.
31We also conducted robustness tests showing that excluding one or both variables from our model does not
substantively alter results.
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Table A.1
Union-nonunion wage dierence. Dierence in median
weekly earnings (in contemporary $)
Industry Dierence
Finance and insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −97
Agriculture, forestry, shing, and hunting . . . . . . . . 0a
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction . . . . . 21
Wholesale trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Retail trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Nondurable goods manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Professional and technical services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Arts, entertainment, and recreation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Durable goods manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Real estate and rental and leasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Health care and social assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Educational services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Accommodation and food services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Management, administrative, and waste services . . 144
Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Transportation and warehousing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Other services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, series LU.
a Not calculated since sample size less then 50,000.
25
Concentration ratio (CR4)
Pe
rc
e
n
t o
f T
o
ta
l
10
30
50
Durable goods manufact.
0 20 40 60 80
Nondurable goods manuf. Retail trade
0 20 40 60 80
Wholesale trade
Transportation Utilities Entertainment
10
30
50
Finance
10
30
50
Information Real estate Education services Food services
0 20 40 60 80
Health services Management serv.
0 20 40 60 80
Professional serv.
10
30
50
Other services
Figure A.1
Industry concentration by major economic sectors
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B. Model eqations
Table B.1
Variables in membership, turnout, and ability test equations
(Y0, Y1) D Mp
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Hispanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Married . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Family size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Rural area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Cohort dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . x x
Unemployment experience . . x
Industry concentration . . . . . . x
Union wage dierential . . . . . . x
Education father . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Education mother . . . . . . . . . . . x
Broken family at 14 . . . . . . . . . x
Number of siblings . . . . . . . . . . x
Family income 1980 . . . . . . . . . x
Age at test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
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C. Treatment effects
To simplify notation, denote by Γ the vector of all model parameters. e average treatment
eect, conditional on covariates, represents the eect of union membership for a randomly chosen
individual with characteristics X . It is given by
ATE(X , Γ) = Pr (Y1 = 1|X , Γ) − Pr (Y0 = 1|X , Γ)
= Φ
(
β ′1X√
1 + α ′1α1
)
− Φ
(
β ′0X√
1 + α ′0α0
)
,
(C.1)
where Φ is the CDF of the normal distribution. e corresponding treatment eect on the treated
represents the eect of union membership on turnout among union members. It is obtained by
conditioning on D = 1:
TT (X , Γ,D = 1) = Pr (Y1 = 1|X ,D = 1, Γ) − Pr (Y0 = 1|X ,D = 1, Γ)
=
(
Φ(β ′DZ )√
1 + α ′DαD
)−1 ∫ [
Φ(β ′1X + α1θ ) − Φ(β ′0X + α0θ )
]
× Φ(β ′DZ + αDθ )ϕ(θ )dθ
(C.2)
Here,ϕ denotes the normal distribution PDF. Since herewe are interested in describing population
average treatment eects of union membership (unconditional of individual characteristics), we
integrate over the (empirical) distribution of X . In other words, E(ATE) = ∫ ATE(x)dFX (x) and
mutatis mutandis for E(TT ).
D. Prior distributions
We assume independent priors for factor coecients in potential outcome equations α j ∼
N (α˜ j , v˜j ), j = 0, 1. We use common inverse Gamma priors for error variances: σ−2p ∼ G(a˜p , b˜p ),
where a and b are shape and scale parameters of the Gamma distribution, respectively. For slopes
in potential outcome and choice equations we use regression-type priors βj ∼ N (β˜j , B˜j ), j = 0, 1,D,
with B˜j = Ijb˜j . Finally, we use normal priors for θ -coecients in our measurement equations, ωp ∼
N (ω˜p , ν˜p ), and we use normal priors for covariates in these equations as well: αMp ∼ N (α˜Mp , ν˜Mp ).
e actual numerical values for these priors are chosen such that they are “uninformative”, i.e., they
express a priori ignorance (for example by having mean zero and large prior variance of, say, 100).
Numerical values used are given in Table D.1.
We conduct a range of prior sensitivity analyses (see Gill 2008: 199f. for an overview). Table D.1
lists hyper-parameter values used in the main text (S1) and for two dierent prior sensitivity simula-
tions. Specication 2 used alternative parameters for the inverse Gamma distribution. Specication
3 use prior variances 10 times larger for loadings and all eect parameters. In all specications prior
mean values were kept at zero to signal our a priori ignorance about the true eect. e result of this
exercise yields estimates that are numerically close and substantively identical to the ones used in
the main text of our paper. Table D.2 shows that the resulting average treatment eects are all very
close.
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Table D.1
Prior parameters specications
Values
Prior hyperparameters S1 S2 S3
α˜ j j = 0, 1 0 0 0
v˜j j = 0, 1 10 10 100
β˜jk j = 0, 1,D; k = 1, . . . ,K 0 0 0
b˜jk j = 0, 1,D; k = 1, . . . ,K 10 10 100
ω˜p p = 1, . . . , P 0 0 0
ν˜p p = 1, . . . , P 10 10 100
α˜Mp p = 1, . . . , P 0 0 0
ν˜Mp p = 1, . . . , P 10 10 100
a˜p p = 1, . . . , P 1 1 1
b˜p p = 1, . . . , P 2 0.005 2
E. Signal-to-noise ratio of ASVAB test items
e core idea of the model in (11) is that each observed ASVAB item contributes information to
identify the latent factor. We don’t use the total variation of each cognitive measurement since a
portion of the variation in test items over individuals is due to measurement error (thus, creating a
simple summed measure of all items mistakes the test for the construct being measured). We can
calculate the fraction of the variance of each item that is due to measurement error (noise) and
underlying latent factor (signal), respectively (see, e.g., Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach 2010: 908).
Table E.1 shows these quantities together with resulting signal-to-noise ratios.
We nd that four items have large signal-to-noise ratios, indicating that their variation provides
substantial information for estimating the latent factor. More than two thirds of the total variation in
arithmetic reasoning, math and word knowledge, and paragraph comprehension is due to variation
Table D.2
Prior robustness checks. Posterior
summary of average treatment eects
under alternative prior parameter values.
Specication Mean SD 95% HPD
S1 0.104 0.018 0.069 0.139
S2 0.105 0.018 0.069 0.140
S3 0.104 0.018 0.069 0.140
29
in θ . Slightly less than half of individual dierences in coding speed are due to θ leading to a
signal-to-noise ratio of less than one.
F. Nonparametric estimates of θ
A critical reader might argue that assuming a normal distribution for θ is an arbitrary choice.
While there is research arguing for this choice on the grounds of its robustness againstmisspecication
note that this assumption is not necessary for our model. Jeisoning the normal distribution
assumption, we also estimate f (θ) semi-parametrically by approximating it using a nite mixture of
normals (Ferguson 1983):
f (θ) =
K∑
k=1
pikϕ(θ |µk ,σ 2)
Here ϕ(·) is the normal density, and pi = (pi1, . . . ,piK )′ is discrete with mass at (µk ,σ 2). To insure
identication
∑
k pik = 1. Even with very few mass points (K being as lile as two) nite normal
mixtures are exible enough to approximate a wide number of densities. (see Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh (2004: ch.6) for an extended discussion). In our empirical application we setK = 3 to produce
a non-parametric estimate of f (θ) in addition to the one based on the normal distribution described
above.
Figure F.1 plots the distribution of θ estimated non-parametrically using a histogram and a kernel
density estimate. It also contains a standard normal distribution as reference point. Comparing both,
we nd the distributional assumption we make in our main specication to be quite reasonable.
Table E.1
Signal-to-noise ratio of ASVAB test items
Signal Noise SNR
Arithmetic reasoning 0.813 0.187 4.364
(0.321)
Word knowledge 0.724 0.276 2.640
(0.188)
Paragraph comprehension 0.667 0.333 2.009
(0.151)
Coding speed 0.472 0.528 0.895
(0.065)
Math knowledge 0.745 0.255 2.927
(0.198)
Note: Standard error of SNR estimate in parentheses
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Figure F.1
Comparison of parametric and nonparametric specication of θ .
is gure shows a histogram of the posterior distribution of θ estimated using a nite mixture of normals
with a kernel density estimate (using a Gaussian kernel with bandwith 0.14 evaluated over 100-point grid)
added. For comparison, we also add the standard normal distribution implied by our main model specication.
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